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Abstract
This paper reexamines the implications of the zero lower bound on interest rates for
monetary policy and the optimal choice of steady-state in°ation in light of the experience
of the recent global recession. There are two main ¯ndings. First, the zero lower bound did
not materially contribute to the sharp declines in output in the United States and many
other economies through the end of 2008, but it is a signi¯cant factor slowing recovery.
Model simulations imply that an additional 4 percentage points of rate cuts would have kept
the unemployment rate from rising as much as it has and would bring the unemployment
and in°ation rates more quickly to steady-state values, but the zero bound precludes these
actions. This inability to lower interest rates comes at the cost of $1.7 trillion of foregone
output over four years. Second, if recent events are a harbinger of a signi¯cantly more
adverse macroeconomic climate than experienced over the preceding two decades, then a 2
percent steady-state in°ation rate may provide an inadequate bu®er to keep the zero bound
from having noticeable deleterious e®ects on the macroeconomy assuming the central bank
follows the standard Taylor Rule. In such an adverse environment, stronger systematic
countercyclical ¯scal policy and/or alternative monetary policy strategies can mitigate the
harmful e®ects of the zero bound with a 2 percent in°ation target. However, even with such
policies, an in°ation target of 1 percent or lower could entail signi¯cant costs in terms of
macroeconomic volatility.
Keywords: Liquidity trap, monetary policy, ¯scal policy.
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(415) 974-2240, e-mail: John.C.Williams@sf.frb.org.Icarus, my son, I charge you to keep at a moderate height, for if you °y too low
the damp will clog your wings, and if too high the heat will melt them.
Daedalus' warning
1 Introduction
Japan's sustained de°ation and near-zero short-term interest rates beginning in the 1990s
ignited an outpouring of research on the implications of the zero lower bound (ZLB) on
nominal interest rates for monetary policy and the macroeconomy. In the presence of
nominal rigidities, the ZLB will at times constrain the central bank's ability to reduce
nominal interest rates in response to negative shocks to the economy. This inability to
reduce real interest rates as low as desired impairs the ability of monetary policy to stabilize
output and in°ation. The quantitative importance of the ZLB depends on the frequency
and degree to which the constraint binds, a key determinant of which is the steady-state,
or \target," in°ation rate. If the steady-state in°ation rate is su±ciently high, the ZLB
will rarely impinge on monetary policy and the macroeconomy. With a su±ciently low
steady-state in°ation rate, however, the ZLB may have more deleterious e®ects. All else
equal, the presence of the ZLB argues for a higher steady-state in°ation rate. Of course, not
all else is equal. Since Bailey (1956), economists have identi¯ed and studied other sources
of distortions related to in°ation besides the ZLB.
Balancing these opposing in°uences on the choice of the optimal in°ation rate, central
banks around the globe have sought to heed Daedalus' advice by choosing an in°ation goal
neither too low nor too high. In practice, many central banks have articulated in°ation
goals centered on 2 to 3 percent (Kuttner 2004). Simulations of macroeconomic models
where monetary policy follows a version of the Taylor (1993) rule indicate that an in°ation
target of 2 percent will entail relatively frequent episodes of the ZLB acting as a binding
constraint on monetary policy (Reifschneider and Williams 2000, Coenen, Orphanides and
Wieland 2004; and Billi 2008). Nonetheless, these simulations predict that with an in°ation
target as low as 2 percent, the deleterious e®ects of the ZLB on macroeconomic volatility
1would be relatively modest because the magnitude and duration of the constraints on policy
actions are relatively mild. Only with in°ation targets of 1 percent or lower does the ZLB
engender signi¯cantly higher variability of output and in°ation in these simulations. In
summary, a 2 percent in°ation target was found to be an adequate bu®er from the point of
view of the ZLB.
The economic tumult of the past two years, with short-term rates near zero in most
major industrial economies, has challenged the conclusion that a 2 percent in°ation target
is su±ciently high to avoid substantial costs from the ZLB. As shown in Figure 1, the
global ¯nancial crisis and recession has driven many major central banks to cut short-term
interest rates e®ectively to zero. Other central banks constrained by the ZLB include the
Swedish Riksbank and the Swiss National Bank. Despite these monetary policy actions and
considerable stimulus from ¯scal policy, these economies are su®ering their worst downturns
in memory. Figure 2 shows the actual and forecasted paths for real GDP for major industrial
economies. In addition, fears of de°ation have intensi¯ed as falling commodity prices and
growing slack put downward pressure on prices. As shown in Figure 3, overall consumer
price index (CPI) in°ation rates have fallen sharply in all major economies. Much of this
decline is due to commodity prices, especially energy prices, but core measures of CPI
in°ation have come down in these economies over the past year as well.
Given these conditions, a strong case can be made for the desirability of additional
monetary stimulus in the United States and in many other countries. But, with rates already
e®ectively at zero, this is not an option, at least in terms of conventional monetary actions.
Several central banks have therefore implemented unconventional monetary actions, such as
changes in the composition and size of the asset side of their balance sheets. But, the short-
and long-term e®ects of these unconventional monetary policies remain highly uncertain
and such policies are at best imperfect substitutes for standard interest rate cuts.
This paper examines the e®ects of the ZLB on the current recession and reevaluates
the expected future e®ects associated with the ZLB and the optimal in°ation rate in light
of new information and research.1 There are two main ¯ndings. First, the ZLB did not
1I do not examine issues related to multiple equilibria studied by Benhabib et al (2001). Instead, as in
2materially contribute to the sharp declines in output in the United States and many other
economies through the end of 2008, but it is a signi¯cant factor slowing recovery. Model
simulations imply that an additional 4 percentage points of rate cuts would have kept the
unemployment rate from rising as much as it has and would bring the unemployment and
in°ation rates more quickly to steady-state values, but the ZLB precludes these actions.
This inability to lower interest rates comes at the cost of $1.7 trillion of foregone output
over four years. Second, if recent events are a harbinger of a signi¯cantly more adverse
macroeconomic climate than experienced over the preceding two decades, then a 2 percent
steady-state in°ation rate may provide an inadequate bu®er to keep the ZLB from having
noticeable deleterious e®ects on the macroeconomy, assuming the central bank follows the
standard Taylor Rule. In such an adverse environment, stronger systematic countercyclical
¯scal policy and/or alternative monetary policy strategies can mitigate the harmful e®ects
of the ZLB with a 2 percent in°ation target. However, even with such policies, an in°ation
target of 1 percent or lower could entail signi¯cant costs in terms of macroeconomic volatility.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II examines the e®ects of the ZLB on the
U.S. economy during the current episode. Section III reexamines the assumptions and
results from past calculations of the macroeconomic e®ects of the ZLB under the Taylor
Rule. Section IV evaluates alternative monetary and ¯scal policies designed to mitigate the
e®ects of the ZLB. Section V concludes.
2 Lessons from the Current Recession
The ongoing global recession provides compelling proof that the ZLB can be a signi¯cant
constraint on monetary policy with potentially enormous macroeconomic repercussions.
This section investigates two questions regarding the role of the ZLB in the current episode.
First, how should one interpret the widespread occurrence of central banks lowering rates
to near zero? Second, what are the consequences of the ZLB in terms of the depth of the
recession and the speed of recovery?
Evans et al (2008), I assume that discretionary ¯scal policy will intervene to assure that a unique steady-state
exists and the economy tends back to that steady state.
3The fact that central banks have been constrained by the ZLB should not not surprising;
in fact, one of the three main \lessons" of Reifschneider and Williams (2000) was that
central banks that pursue in°ation goals of around 2 percent would encounter the ZLB
relatively frequently.2 For example, Reifschneider and Williams (2002) ¯nd that with a 2
percent in°ation target, roughly in line with the practices of many major central banks, a
calibrated version of the Taylor rule (1993) hits the ZLB about 10 percent of the time in
simulations of the Federal Reserve Board's FRB/US macroeconometric model. Given that
in°ation has been centered around 2 percent in the United States since the early 1990s, it
was fully predictable that the ZLB would become an issue{either as a threat, as in 2004, or
as a reality, as it is today.
Indeed, the widespread occurrence of central banks running into the ZLB is evidence
that they have learned a second lesson from research that policymakers should not shy
away from the ZLB, but should instead \embrace" it. A common theme in research on the
ZLB is that when the economy weakens signi¯cantly or de°ation risks arise, central banks
should act quickly and aggressively to get rates down as soon as possible to maximize the
monetary stimulus in the system when the economy is weakening. \Keeping your powder
dry" is precisely the worst thing to do. Figure 4 shows nominal and ex post real rates on
short-term Treasury securities going back to the 1920s. Despite the low rate of in°ation and
three recessions, nominal interest rates did not once approach the ZLB back then. That
the ZLB appears to be a greater problem today than in the 1950s and early 1960s, when
in°ation was also low, may re°ect \better" monetary policy in the more recent period.
Indeed, a comparison of estimated Taylor-type rules covering that period and the more
recent past indicates that short-term interest rates were far less sensitive to movements in
output and in°ation during the earlier period (Romer and Romer, 2002). Of course, the
2Note that the lower bound does not necessarily equal zero. On one hand, lowering the interest rate
below a small positive value may incur costly disruptions to money and other short-term ¯nancing markets.
In this case, central banks may choose not to lower rates all the way to zero, making the e®ective lower
bound a small positive number. On the other hand, a central bank can in principle lower interest rates below
zero by charging interest on reserves. However, there are still limits to how low interest rates can go because
banks and other agents can choose to hold currency instead, which yields zero interest less an holding cost
·, equal to the cost of safely storing and transporting cash). So, instead of a \zero bound," there is a ¡·
lower bound on short-term interest rates.
4U.S. economy and ¯nancial system were very di®erent 50 years ago so other factors may
also explain the di®erences in interest rate behavior.
To answer the second question, I conduct counterfactual simulations of the Federal Re-
serve's FRB/US model where the Federal Reserve is not constrained by the ZLB.3 The
simulations are best thought of as scenarios where the economy entered the current episode
with a higher steady-state in°ation rate and therefore the Federal Reserve had a large inter-
est rate bu®er to work with. I consider experiments in which the Federal Reserve is able to
lower the funds rate by up to 600 basis points more than it has. For comparison, Rudebusch
(2009) ¯nds that the funds rate would be predicted to fall to about -5 percent based on an
estimated monetary policy rule and FOMC forecasts. Of course, these experiments are not
real policy options available to the Fed. But they allow me to quantify the e®ects of the
ZLB on the evolution of the U.S. economy.
In evaluating the role played by the ZLB, it is important to get the timing of events
correctly. Private forecasters did not anticipate that the ZLB would be a binding constraint
on monetary policy until very late in 2008. Figure 5 shows the expected path of the fed
funds rate according to the Blue Chip forecasts at various points in 2008 and 2009. At the
beginning of September 2008{right before the failure of Lehman Brothers and the ensuing
panic{forecasters did not expect the funds rate to fall below 2 percent. It was not until
early December 2008, when the full rami¯cations of the panic became clear, that forecasters
came to anticipate a sustained period of rates below 1 percent and the zero lower bound
clearly came into in play. In fact, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) cut the
target funds rate from 1 percent to a 0 to 1/4 percentage point range on December 16, 2008.
A similar pattern is seen in forecasts of policy rates in other major industrial economies,
where central banks except for Japan made their ¯nal rate cuts later than the FOMC.
The preceding argument is based on evidence from point forecasts, which typically
correspond to modal forecasts. In theory, economic decisions depend on the full distribution
3See Brayton et al 1997 for a description of the FRB/US model. In the counterfactual simulations I use
the version of FRB/US with VAR expectations. In the stochastic simulations used to evaluate alternative
policy rules discussed in Sections III and IV of the paper, I use the version of FRB/US with rational
expectations.
5of the forecasts, not just the mode. The possibility that the ZLB could bind in the future
may have introduced signi¯cant downward asymmetry in forecast distributions of output
and in°ation in late 2008. Such an increase in the tail risk of a severe recession could have
caused households and businesses to curtail spending more than they would have if the
ZLB was not looming on the horizon. Although the evidence is not de¯nitive, forecasts in
late 2008 do not appear to provide much support for such a channel. Based on options on
fed funds futures (see Carlson et al 2005), even as late as early November 2008, market
participants placed only about a 25 percent probability of a target rate equal of 50 basis
points or lower in January 2009. In addition, the distribution of forecasts for real GDP
growth in 2009 from the Survey of Professional Forecasters in the fourth quarter of 2008
does not display obvious signs of asymmetric downside risks.
In summary, the available evidence suggests that through late 2008, that is, until the
rami¯cations of the ¯nancial panic following the failure of Lehman Brothers were recog-
nized, the ZLB was not viewed by forecasters as a binding constraint on policy. Therefore,
it is unlikely that it had a major impact on the economy before that time outside Japan.
Importantly, this is the period in which the economy was contracting most rapidly. Ac-
cording to monthly GDP ¯gures constructed by Macroeconomic Advisors, the period of
sharp declines in real GDP ended in January 2009, with real GDP falling by 2 percent in
December 2008 and 0.7 percent in January 2009. Real GDP was roughly °at from January
through July 2009.
Since early 2009, however, the ZLB has clearly been a constraint on monetary policy
in the United States and abroad. Interestingly, forecasters and market participants expect
the ZLB to be a relatively short-lived problem outside Japan. The dashed lines in Figure
1 show market expectations of overnight interest rates derived from future contracts as of
September 2009. Market participants expect major central banks except for the Bank of
Japan to start raising rates by early 2010. As seen in Figure 5, Blue Chip forecasters have
likewise consistently predicted that the Fed would start raising rates after about a year
of near-zero rates. Even those forecasters in the bottom tail of the interest rate forecast
6distribution of the Blue Chip panel expect the ZLB to constrain policy for only about a
year and a half. Based on these expectations that central banks will raise rates relatively
soon, one might be tempted to conclude that the e®ects of the ZLB have been relatively
modest. Arguing against that conclusion is that four quarters is the mean duration in
which the ZLB constrained policy in model simulations with a 2 percent in°ation target
reported in Reifschneider and Williams (2000) and that such episodes can in°ict costs on
the macroeconomy. Moreover, these forecasts of the future paths of interest rates may prove
to be inaccurate.
I construct the counterfactual simulations based upon a baseline forecast set equal to
the August 2009 Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) forecast (Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia, 2009). The baseline forecast for the short-term interest rate, the unemploy-
ment rate, and the core personal consumption price (PCE) index in°ation rate are shown in
Figures 6, 7, and 8, respectively.4 The SPF also foresees the unemployment rate remaining
above 7 percent through 2012 and core PCE price in°ation remaining below the median
value of the FOMC's long-run in°ation forecasts of 2 percent through 2011. Interestingly,
this forecast has the core in°ation rate rising over 2010-11 despite the high rate of unem-
ployment during that period. Such a forecast is consistent with a Phillips curve model of
in°ation in which in°ation expectations are well anchored around 2 percent (Williams 2009).
Note that these forecasts incorporate the e®ects of the ¯scal stimulus and unconventional
monetary policy actions taken in the United States and abroad.
I consider three alternative paths for the nominal funds rate and examine the resulting
simulated values of the unemployment rate and the core PCE price in°ation rate. Based
on the evidence presented above that the ZLB was not a binding constraint until the very
end of 2008, I assume that the additional nominal rate cuts occur in 2009q1. I assume the
entire additional cut occurs in that quarter and that the rates are held below the baseline
values through 2010q4, after which the short-term nominal rate returns to its baseline (SPF
4The SPF does not provide a forecast for the fed funds rate, but does provide a forecast for the 3-month
Treasury rate, which I use as a proxy for the fed funds rate. In addition, the SPF does not report quarterly
¯gures for 2011 and 2012. I interpolated quarterly ¯gures based on annual ¯gures for those years and the
multi-year forecasts for PCE price index in°ation.
7forecast) value. I assume no modi¯cations of the discretionary ¯scal policy actions and
unconventional monetary policy actions that are assumed in the baseline forecast. I further
assume that the monetary transmission mechanism works as predicted by the FRB/US
model; that is, the disruptions in ¯nancial sectors do not change the marginal e®ect of
additional rate cuts.5 Admittedly, these are strong assumptions, but I do not see better
alternatives. The results of the simulations are shown in Figures 6, 7, and 8.
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where ¼ is the core PCE price index in°ation rate, u is the unemployment rate, and u¤ is
the natural rate of unemployment. The in°ation goal is assumed to be 2 percent. The SPF
forecast only runs through late 2012, so I cannot extend the calculation of the loss beyond
that point, nor can I use the optimal control techniques developed by Svensson and Tetlow
(2005). Table 1 summarizes the outcomes for the baseline forecast and the alternative policy
simulations. The ¯rst four columns of numbers in the table report the central bank losses
for di®erent weights on unemployment stabilization in the loss function, ¸, and di®erent
values for the natural rate of unemployment, u¤, assumed in the loss function.6 The values
for the natural rate included in the table cover the range of recent estimates. The median
estimate of the natural rate of unemployment in the most recent SPF survey percent was 5
percent, while the highest reported estimate was 6 percent. Weidner and Williams (2009)
provide evidence suggesting the natural rate of unemployment may currently be as high
as 7 percent. The ¯nal two column report the simulated values of the unemployment and
in°ation rates at the end of the forecast period (2012q4).
The additional 200 basis points of rate cuts speeds the pace of economic recovery relative
to the baseline forecast, bringing the unemployment rate near 6-1/2 percent by the end of
5Some argue that monetary policy may be more or less e®ective than usual in the current environment,
but there is little empirical evidence to guide any modi¯cations of the model.
6Note that I assume the same baseline forecast independent of the value of the natural rate of unem-
ployment used in computing the central bank loss. That is, I treat the natural rate of unemployment as
an unobservable variable that underlies the baseline forecast. In particular, I do not consider alternative
baseline forecasts predicated on alternative views of the natural rate of unemployment.
8Table 1: E®ects of Alternative Monetary Policy Paths
L
Simulation ¸ = 0 ¸ = 1 2012q4 Value
u¤ = 5 u¤ = 6 u¤ = 7 u ¼
Baseline forecast 4.4 248.0 142.0 68.0 7.3 2.0
2 percentage point lower interest rate 2.5 193.5 103.8 46.1 6.6 2.2
4 percentage point lower interest rate 1.4 151.0 77.5 36.0 5.9 2.3
6 percentage point lower interest rate 1.3 120.2 63.0 37.8 5.2 2.5
This table reports the central bank losses and the simulated unemployment and in°ation rates
in 2012q4 from FRB/US model simulations of alternative monetary policy paths over 2009-2012.
The baseline is the August 2009 Survey of Professional Forecasters forecast. The natural rate
of unemployment is denoted by u¤. The assumed in°ation target is 2 percent.
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2012. The reduction in slack and the lower exchange value of the dollar cause core price
in°ation to rise more quickly back to 2 percent. In fact, core in°ation slightly overshoots
2 percent by the end of 2012. As seen in the second row of the table, this policy reduces
the central bank loss function by a considerable amount, for all combinations of parameters
reported in the table. In the baseline forecast, in°ation is below target for nearly the entire
forecast period and the unemployment rate is consistently above the natural rate, so the
200 basis points of rate cuts move both objective variables closer to target. Only in the
¯nal few quarters of the simulation do tradeo®s materialize.
The second simulation of 400 basis points of easing relative to baseline is more e®ective
at bringing the unemployment rate down and in°ation closer to the assumed 2 percent
target over most of the forecast period. This policy yields a much lower central bank loss
for all parameter combinations reported in the table. The results are striking. Even when
the sole objective is the stabilization of in°ation, an additional 400 basis points of easing is
called for. Similarly, when the central bank cares about stabilizing unemployment around
its natural rate, even with a 7 percent natural rate of unemployment, 400 basis points of
easing reduces the central bank loss. One concern with this policy is that in°ation is above
2 percent by the end of 2012 and trending upward. Policy needs to be tightened at some
point to bring in°ation back down to 2 percent. Of course, in all cases, the appropriate
path for policy in 2012 and beyond depends on the natural rate of unemployment and the
9evolution of the economy in later years.
The third simulation of 600 basis points of easing relative to baseline yields mixed
results. It yields a smaller loss over the simulation period as long as the natural rate of
unemployment is below 7 percent. But, it accomplishes this at the cost of an in°ation rate
that is 1/2 percent above the assumed target at the end of 2012. Based on these results,
such a sharp reduction in rates would only be bene¯cial if the natural rate of unemployment
is not much higher than 5 percent and if it were followed by a much sharper increase in
interest rates in 2011 and 2012 than assumed in the simulation.
Based on these results, a compelling case can be made that at least an additional 400
basis points of rate reductions would have been bene¯cial in terms of stabilizing in°ation
around a 2 percent target and the unemployment around its natural rate. The magnitude
of the costs of the ZLB can be measured in terms of the di®erences in real output between
the baseline forecast and the alternative simulation of an additional 400 basis points of rate
cuts. In that simulation, real GDP averages about 3 percent above the baseline forecast
over 2009-2012 (the unemployment rate averages about 1 percentage point below baseline
over this period). An additional 4 percentage points of monetary stimulus yields a total
increase in output over these four years of about $1.7 trillion. This translates to an increase
in per capita output of a total of about $5500, summing over these four years. The implied
increase in consumption is about 2 percent on average, which translates into total increase
in per capita consumption of about $2600, again summing over the four years. These
calculations abstract from the additional e®ects on output outside the forecast window. By
any measure, these are sizable losses from the ZLB and much larger than estimates of the
typical cost of business cycles.7
A ¯nal caveat regarding these simulations is in order. A notable feature of these al-
ternative scenarios is that they entail sizable negative real interest rates for two years. In
the second alternative scenario of a 400 basis point reduction in interest rates, the real
7The current episode, as projected by the SPF forecast, is an outlier in both depth and duration compared
to past post World War II recessions. But, as argued in this paper, the ZLB has played a key role in this
outcome, a situation that has not occurred since the Great Depression.
10funds rate averages below -5 percent during 2009 and 2010. As seen in Figure 4, there
have been few peacetime episodes of large sustained negative real interest rates. Although
clearly helpful from the perspective of stimulating the economy, there is the possibility that
such a lengthy period of very negative real interest rates could have harmful unintended
consequences, such as fueling another speculative boom and bust cycle (see, for example,
Taylor 2007).
3 Reexamining the Lessons from Research
These simulations illustrate the large costs associated with the ZLB in the current situation.
If this recession represents a unique, extraordinary incident, it has had no implications for
the choice of in°ation goal or design of a policy rule regarding the ZLB. Indeed, a third
\lesson" from Reifschneider and Williams (2000) is that there will be rare instances when
the ZLB is very destructive to the macroeconomy, requiring ¯scal or other policies to avoid
a complete economic collapse. The recent episode{characterized by reckless risk taking
on a global scale, poor risk management, lax regulatory oversight, and a massive asset
bubble{may be such a 100-year °ood. Alternatively, this episode may have exposed some
cracks in the analysis of the ZLB's e®ects on the ability of central banks to achieve their
macroeconomic stabilization goals. In this section, I review key assumptions from the
literature and conduct \stress tests" of past research, applying lessons from the past few
years.
The magnitude of the welfare loss owing to the ZLB depends critically on four factors:
the model of the economy, the steady-state nominal interest rate bu®er (equal to the sum
of the steady-state in°ation rate, ¼¤, and the steady-state, or \equilibrium," real interest
rates, r¤), the nature of the disturbances to the economy, and the monetary and ¯scal policy
regime. Recent events have challenged a number of assumptions regarding the structure of
the macro models used in past research on the ZLB. Eventually, new models will emerge
from the experience of the past few years, but for now I am limited to the models that
exist.8 Because the e®ects of the ZLB depend on the extent of nominal and real frictions
8Beyond the need for better models of ¯nancial frictions, the global nature of the crisis has important
11(Coenen 2003) and the full set of shocks bu®eting the economy, quantitative research into
the e®ects of the ZLB is best done with richer models that incorporate such frictions. For
this reason, in this paper, I use the Federal Reserve Board's FRB/US model for my analysis,
rather than a small-scale stylized model.
One critical aspect of model speci¯cation is the assumption that in°ation expectations
would remain well anchored. As discussed in Reifschneider and Williams (2000) and Evans
et al (2008), absent anchored in°ation expectations, the ZLB could give rise to a calamitous
de°ationary spiral with rising rates of de°ation sending real interest rates soaring and the
economy into a tailspin. In the event, in°ation expectations have been remarkably well
behaved in all major industrial economies. The dashed lines in Figure 3 show consensus
forecasts of overall in°ation in several countries. Despite the severity of the downturn,
forecasters expect in°ation rates to bounce back up over this year and next. Long-run
in°ation expectations in these countries, shown in Figure 9, have also been very stable over
the past several years, despite the large swings in commodity prices and the severe global
recession. Thus far, at least, in°ation expectations appear to be well anchored. But, there
remains a risk that in°ation expectations could become unmoored, in which case the ZLB
poses a larger threat.
A second key assumption is the steady-state real interest rate, which, along with the
steady-state in°ation rate, provides the bu®er for monetary policy actions to stabilize the
economy. A worrying development over the past decade is a decline in real interest rates.
The long-run average of the real interest rate{de¯ned to be the nominal federal funds
rate less the PCE price index in°ation rate{is about 2-1/2 percent, the ¯gure used by
Reifschneider and Williams (2000). But, the Kalman ¯lter estimate of the equilibrium real
rate of interest has fallen to about 1 percent, as shown in Figure 10. Other time-series based
estimates show similar, or even larger, declines. For example, the trend real interest rate
computed using the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter (with smoothing parameter of 1600) is around
zero in the second quarter of 2009.
implications for the e®ects of the ZLB and the ability of monetary policy to stabilize the economy (Bodenstein
et al 2009).
12As seen in Figure 10, the decline in the Kalman ¯lter estimate of the equilibrium real
interest rate is associated with the recent severe downturn and may prove to be an over-
reaction to the deep recession. This conclusion receives some support from data from
in°ation-indexed Treasury securities. Evidently, investors expect real interest rates to re-
main low over the next ¯ve years, but to be closer to historically normal levels thereafter.
Nonetheless, given the massive loss in wealth here and abroad and the resulting increase in
private saving, there is a risk that the steady-state real interest rate will remain low for some
time (Glick and Lansing, 2009). Based on this evidence, a reasonable point estimate of the
steady-state real fed funds rate is about 2-1/2 percent, but there is a real risk that it could
be as low as 1 percent. Of course, the steady-state real rate could be higher than 2-1/2
percent, possibly owing to large ¯scal de¯cits in the United States and abroad (Laubach
2009). In that case, the e®ects of the ZLB would be correspondingly muted.
The third key assumption is the nature of the disturbances to the economy. Because the
ZLB a®ects events in the lower tail of the distribution of interest rates, the distribution of
the shocks is a critical factor determining the e®ects of the ZLB. Reifschneider and Williams
(2000, 2002) based their analysis on the covariance of estimated disturbances from the mid-
1960s through the 1990s. Other research is based on disturbances from the period of the
Great Moderation from the early 1980s on (Coenen, Orphanides, and Wieland 2004; Adam
and Billi 2006; Williams 2006). Recent events hint that what were once thought to be
negative \tail" events may occur frequently and that the period of the Great Moderation
may provide an overly optimistic view of the future macroeconomic landscape. Given the
limited number of observations since the start of the ¯nancial crisis, it is not yet possible
to ascertain whether these events represent a sustained break from the past behavior of
disturbances.
Given the great deal of uncertainty{much of it di±cult or even impossible to quantify{
regarding the future economic environment, I take a minimax approach to evaluating poli-
cies. Speci¯cally, I look for policies that perform well in very adverse or \worst-case" sce-
narios as well as in the baseline scenario. I take the baseline scenario to be a steady-state
13real interest rate of 2-1/2 percent and disturbances drawn from a joint normal distribution
based on model disturbances from 1968-2002. I consider alternative adverse scenarios char-
acterized by a steady-state real interest rate of 1 percent and disturbances drawn from more
adverse distributions. Of course, these two sources of uncertainty represent only a slice of
the spectrum of uncertainty relevant for the ZLB. By taking worst cases from these two
sources, the aim is provide insurance against a wide variety of other forms of uncertainty,
including model misspeci¯cation, unanchored in°ation expectations, etc..
I follow the simulation methodology of Reifschneider and Williams (2000) with two
relatively minor modi¯cations. First, the simulation results reported here are based on a
more recent vintage of the FRB/US model from 2004. Second, following Orphanides et
al (2000) and Reifschneider and Williams (2002), I assume that the output gap included
in the monetary policy rule is subject to exogenous, serially-correlated mismeasurement.
The estimates of the simulated moments are based on two sets of stochastic simulations,
lasting a total of 25,000 years of simulated data.9 The use of such extremely long simulations
provides reasonably accurate estimates of model-implied moments, e®ectively eliminates the
e®ects of initial conditions, and implies that rare events occur in the simulations. Finally, I
assume that automatic stabilizers and other endogenous responses of ¯scal variables behave
as usual, but that discretionary ¯scal policy is not used except in extreme downturns.
In the following, unless otherwise indicated, monetary policy is assumed to follow a
Taylor-type policy rule of the form:
it = maxf0;r¤
t + ¹ ¼t + 0:5(¹ ¼t ¡ ¼¤) + Áytg; (2)
where it is the nominal interest rate, r¤
t is the steady-state real interest rate, ¹ ¼ is the four-
quarter percent change in the PCE price index, ¼¤ is the in°ation target, and yt is the
output gap. 10 Following Orphanides and Williams (2002), I refer to the speci¯cation with
Á = 0:5 as the \Classic" Taylor (1993) rule and other speci¯cations as \Taylor-type" rules.
9In the simulations using disturbances following the t distribution, I conduct twice the normal number
of simulations.
10I have included an upward bias in the notional in°ation target in the policy rule that is needed for the
in°ation rate to equal the true target level. As discussed in Reifschneider and Williams (2002) and Coenen,
Orphanides, and Wieland (2004), the asymmetric nature of the ZLB implies that the in°ation rate will on
average be lower than the in°ation target in the rule. The magnitude of this upward bias is larger, the more
14The simulated outcomes are evaluated using a central bank loss function (that slightly
di®ers from that used earlier)of the form:
L = E
n
(¼ ¡ ¼¤)2 + y2 + 0:25 ¤ (i ¡ i¤)2
o
; (3)
where ¼ is the overall PCE price index in°ation rate, i¤ = ¼¤ + r¤ is the unconditional
mean of the nominal short-term interest rate, and E denotes the unconditional expectation.
Note that I consider only the costs of in°ation variability and not the costs of steady-state
in°ation, on the grounds that our understanding of the costs of steady-state in°ation is
very limited.11 Thus, I stop short of ¯nding optimal in°ation targets. I return to the issue
of the costs of steady-state in°ation brie°y in the conclusion.
The upper panel of Table 2 reports the simulated outcomes under the classic Taylor
rule assuming the shocks are drawn using a normal distribution from the covariance matrix
computed from the full sample of disturbances (1968-2002). The ¯rst two columns report
the steady-state in°ation rates corresponding to alternative values of the steady-state real
interest rate, r¤. In terms of the model simulations, the key statistic is the nominal interest
rate bu®er, which equals the sum of the steady-state in°ation rate, ¼¤, and the steady-state
real interest rate, r¤. In the baseline scenario, the steady-state real interest rate is assumed
to be 2-1/2 percent. For this case, the numbers indicated in the ¯rst column of the table
correspond to the values of the steady-state in°ation target. In the case of a steady-state
real interest rate of 1 percent, the numbers in the second column of the table correspond
to the values of the steady-state in°ation target. The third and fourth columns report the
share of time that the nominal federal funds rate is below 0.1 and 1 percentage points,
respectively. The ¯fth column reports the share of the time that the output gap is below
-4 percent, representing a major recession of the type that has occurred in 1958, 1975,
1982-83, and 2009. For comparison, over 1955q1-2009q2 about 6 percent of the time, the
CBO estimate of the output gap was below -4 percent. The sixth through ninth columns
the ZLB constrains policy. I correct for this downward bias by adjusting the in°ation target in the policy
rule.
11Alternatively, this approach can be justi¯ed by assuming that ¯rms increase prices at the steady-state
in°ation rate without occurring adjustment costs (in an adjustment cost model) or reoptimizing (in a Calvo
model).
15report the standard deviations of the output gap, the PCE price index in°ation rate, and
the nominal federal funds rate. The ¯nal column reports the central bank loss.
In the baseline scenario, if policy follows the classic Taylor rule, then the ZLB has only
minor a®ects on the magnitude of macroeconomic °uctuations if the in°ation target is 1-1/2
percent or higher. Under these assumptions, a 1-1/2 percent in°ation target implies that
the funds rate will fall below 1 percent 10 percent of the time, and will be below 10 basis
points 6 percent of the time. The standard deviation of the unconstrained interest rate is
only about 2-1/2 percent. So, with a 4 percentage point bu®er, most episodes where the
ZLB is binding are relatively mild and e®ects are minor. These results are consistent with
those of many studies that with a steady-state nominal interest rate of 4 percent or higher,
the ZLB has very modest macroeconomic e®ects under the Taylor rule.
If the steady-state real interest rate is only 1 percent, then under the classic Taylor rule
a 3 percent in°ation objective is su±ciently high to avoid most costs from the ZLB. With a
2 percent in°ation goal, the ZLB binds 13 percent of the time and causes a more noticeable
rise in output gap variability (a rise of 0.3 percentage points relative to a 5 percent or
higher in°ation goal). The incidence of deep recessions rises as well, but remains below 10
percent. Based on this evidence, a lower steady-state real interest rate argues for a higher
in°ation goal to reduce the costs associated with the ZLB. But, it alone does not overturn
the basic result of past research that a 2 percent in°ation goal is associated with relatively
modest costs from the ZLB. This conclusion is reinforced when one considers alternative
policy rules that mitigate the problems associated with the ZLB, as discussed below.
As noted above, the assumption of normally distributed disturbances may understate
the likelihood of tail events of the type that we have recently experienced. To gauge the
sensitivity of the results to this assumption, I conduct simulations where the disturbances
have the same covariance as before (that is, based on the full 1968-2002 sample), but
are assumed to follow the t distribution with 5 degrees of freedom. This distribution is
characterized by excess (relative to the normal distribution) kurtosis of 6; that is, it displays
signi¯cantly fatter tails than the normal distribution. For example, the probability of a three
16Table 2: Outcomes for Di®erent Shock Distributions
In°ation Target Probability Std. Dev.
r¤ = 2:5 r¤ = 1 i < 0:1 i < 1 y < ¡4 y ¼ i L
Shocks drawn from 1968-2002 covariance; normally distributed
-0.5 1 .23 .31 .12 3.1 1.5 2.4 13.3
0.5 2 .13 .20 .08 2.8 1.5 2.4 11.5
1.5 3 .06 .10 .06 2.6 1.5 2.5 10.6
2.5 4 .04 .08 .06 2.6 1.5 2.6 10.5
3.5 5 .02 .03 .06 2.5 1.5 2.6 10.1
5.5 7 .00 .00 .05 2.5 1.5 2.6 9.9
7.5 9 .00 .00 .05 2.5 1.5 2.6 9.9
Shocks drawn from 1968-2002 covariance; t(5) distributed
-0.5 1 .24 .33 .13 3.1 1.5 2.4 13.2
0.5 2 .13 .20 .08 2.8 1.5 2.5 11.5
1.5 3 .08 .13 .07 2.7 1.5 2.5 10.8
2.5 4 .04 .07 .06 2.6 1.5 2.7 10.6
3.5 5 .03 .05 .06 2.6 1.5 2.7 10.6
5.5 7 .00 .00 .05 2.5 1.5 2.6 9.9
7.5 9 .00 .00 .05 2.5 1.5 2.6 9.9
Shocks drawn from 1968-1983 covariance; normally distributed
-0.5 1 .29 .38 .18 3.7 1.7 2.6 18.4
0.5 2 .16 .23 .12 3.3 1.6 2.8 15.5
1.5 3 .09 .14 .11 3.2 1.6 2.8 14.5
2.5 4 .04 .07 .09 3.0 1.6 2.8 13.6
3.5 5 .03 .06 .09 2.9 1.6 2.9 13.4
5.5 7 .02 .03 .08 2.9 1.6 2.9 13.0
7.5 9 .00 .00 .08 2.9 1.6 2.9 13.0
Notes: This table reports simulated moments for di®erent assumptions regarding
the distribution of shocks. Results are shown for two values of the steady-state
real interest rate, r¤. The ¯rst column indicates the in°ation target assuming
r¤ = 2:5; the second column indicates the in°ation target assuming r¤ = 1.
Monetary policy rule: it = maxf0;r¤
t + ¹ ¼t + 0:5(¹ ¼t ¡ ¼¤) + 0:5ytg.
Central bank loss: L = E
©
(¼ ¡ ¼¤)2 + y2 + 0:25 ¤ (i ¡ i¤)2ª
, where i¤ = ¼¤ + r¤.
standard deviation (or greater) event is over 4 times greater with this t(5) distribution than
the normal distribution.12
Allowing for a fatter-tailed distribution of distributions does not materially a®ect the
results regarding the e®ects of the ZLB. The middle panel of Table 2 reports the results
from these simulations. The ZLB is encountered slightly more often, and the standard
deviations of the output gap are in some cases higher, but these e®ects are nearly lost in
rounding. Note that the shocks being used di®er from those used in the other simulations,
12The choice of the degrees of freedom of 5 is somewhat arbitrary, but near the lower bound of allowable
values for the purpose at hand. In particular, the degrees of freedom of the t distribution must exceed 4 for
¯nite second and fourth moments to exist.
17so comparison to the simulations using normally distributed disturbances is not exact due
to the ¯nite samples of the simulations. Similar results (not reported) were obtained when
the disturbances were assumed to follow a Laplace distribution, which has excess kurtosis
of 3. There may be more exotic distributions with even greater kurtosis that would have
greater e®ects on these results, but a more critical issue appears to be the covariance of the
shocks, rather than the precise shape of the distribution.
The e®ects of the ZLB are far more pronounced when the shocks are drawn from the pre-
Great Moderation period. In the simulations reported in the lower portion of the table, the
disturbances are drawn from a normal distribution where the covariance of disturbances
is estimated from the 1968-1983 sample of model disturbances. As a result, the ZLB is
encountered more frequently and with greater costs in terms of stabilization of the output
gap. With a steady-state real interest rate of 2-1/2 percent, a 2 percent in°ation target is
just on the edge of the region where the ZLB has nontrivial costs in terms of macroeconomic
variability. In°ation goals of 1-1/2 percent or lower entail moderate increases in output gap
variability.
The combination of a 1 percent steady-state real interest rate and greater volatility of
disturbances poses the greatest threat to macroeconomic stabilization in a low in°ation
environment. In°ation goals of 2 to 3 percent are associated with some increase in output
gap variability, while a 1 percent in°ation goal entails a signi¯cant increase in output gap
variability. Even in these extreme cases, the e®ects on in°ation variability are quite modest,
re°ecting the e®ects of assumption of well-anchored expectations.
How big are these losses? One metric is the fraction of the time the output gap is
below -4 percent. In the adverse environment of shocks drawn from the 1968-1983 shock
covariance and a steady-state real interest rate of 1 percent, this ¯gure rises from 9 percent
to 18 percent when the in°ation target is reduced from 4 to 1 percent. The standard
deviation of the output gap rise by 0.7 percentage point. For comparison, the standard
deviation of the output gap during the \Great Moderation" period of 1985-2006 was 2
percentage points, according to CBO estimates. The comparable ¯gure for 1965-1980 was
182.7 percentage points. Thus, moving from a 4 percent in°ation target to a 1 percent in°ation
target yields an increase in output gap variability in these model simulations comparable
to switching from the Great Moderation period to the 1965-1980 period. Moving from a 4
percent in°ation target to a 2 percent target entails an increase in output gap variability
comparable to switching from the Great Moderation period to the period of 1955-1965,
when the standard deviation of the output gap was 2.3 percentage points, 0.3 percentage
points above that during the Great Moderation period.
4 Alternative Monetary and Fiscal Policies
The results reported above indicate that in a particulary adverse macroeconomic environ-
ment of large shocks and a low steady-state real interest rate, the ZLB may cause a signi¯-
cant deterioration in macroeconomic performance when monetary policy follows the classic
Taylor rule with a very low in°ation target. As discussed in Reifschneider and Williams
(2000, 2002) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), alternative monetary policy strategies
improve upon the performance of the classic Taylor rule in a low in°ation environment. Sev-
eral such modi¯cations are examined here. In addition, I consider the use of countercyclical
¯scal policy to mitigate the e®ects of the ZLB. Throughout the following discussion, I as-
sume the worst-case adverse macroeconomic environment of a 1 percent steady-state real
interest rate and disturbances drawn from the covariance matrix computed from the shocks
of the pre-Great Moderation period.
4.1 Modifying the Taylor rule
One way to achieve greater stabilization of the output gap even at low steady-state in°ation
rates and in an adverse environment is for the policy rule to respond more aggressively to
movements in the output gap. Table 3 reports simulation results for alternative values of the
coe±cient on the output gap, Á, in the monetary policy rule. A larger response to output
gap reduces output gap variability and allows the central bank to reach output and in°ation
goals at some cost of interest rate variability, even at in°ation goals as low as 2 percent. For
example, assume the goal is to have outcomes like those under classic Taylor rule (Á = 0:5)
19unconstrained by the ZLB, but with an in°ation target of 2 percent. The Taylor-type rule
with the stronger response to the output gap of Á = 1:5 yields outcomes for output gap
and in°ation rate variability close to that of the Classic Taylor rule unconstrained by the
ZLB, at the cost of somewhat greater interest rate variability. Similarly, outcomes similar
to the unconstrained classic Taylor rule can be achieved with an in°ation goal of 3 percent
by setting Á = 1.
Interestingly, too strong a response to the output gap can be counterproductive at very
low steady-state interest rates. This outcome likely re°ects the asymmetry of the policy
response resulting from the ZLB. When the output gap is positive, policy tightens sharply.
But, when the output gap is negative, the policy response is more likely to be truncated by
the ZLB. This strongly asymmetric response causes output gap variability to rise at very
low in°ation targets in the adverse macroeconomic environment. A stronger response to
in°ation in the Taylor-type rule does not have much e®ect on the e®ects of the ZLB (not
shown).13
None of these modi¯ed Taylor Rules performs well with an in°ation target of 1 percent
in the adverse macroeconomic environment. In all three cases, the standard deviation of
the output gap rises sharply with an in°ation target of 1 percent. The fraction of time that
the output gap is below -4 percent is extremely high, between 17 and 20 percent. These
¯gures decline dramatically when the in°ation target is raised to 2 percent.
Other modi¯cations to the Taylor-type rule can also be e®ective at o®setting the e®ects
of the ZLB in low in°ation environments. The upper panels of Table 4 report the results
from a modi¯ed Taylor-type rule proposed by Reifschneider and Williams (2000). According
to this policy rule, realized deviations of the interest rate from that prescribed by the rule
owing to the ZLB are later o®set by negative deviations of equal magnitude. Note that this
does not necessarily imply the central bank is promising to raise in°ation above its target in
the future, but only that it makes up for \lost monetary stimulus" by holding the interest
13There are other reasons, however, for a stronger response to in°ation, such as the better anchoring of
in°ation expectations in an economy with imperfect knowledge, as discussed in Orphanides and Williams
2002, 2007.
20Table 3: Alternative Responses to Output Gap (Á) in Adverse Environment
(1968-83 shock covariance and r¤ = 1)
In°ation Probability Std. Dev.
Target i < 0:1 i < 1 y < ¡4 y ¼ i L
Á = 0:5
1 .29 .38 .18 3.7 1.7 2.6 18.4
2 .16 .23 .12 3.3 1.6 2.8 15.5
3 .09 .14 .11 3.2 1.6 2.8 14.5
4 .04 .07 .09 3.0 1.6 2.8 13.6
5 .03 .06 .09 2.9 1.6 2.9 13.4
7 .02 .03 .08 2.9 1.6 2.9 13.0
9 .00 .00 .08 2.9 1.6 2.9 13.0
Á = 1
1 .34 .41 .17 4.6 2.1 2.6 27.3
2 .16 .22 .08 3.1 1.7 3.3 15.2
3 .11 .15 .06 2.7 1.6 3.4 13.1
4 .08 .12 .06 2.6 1.6 3.4 12.4
5 .06 .10 .06 2.5 1.6 3.5 12.0
7 .02 .03 .05 2.5 1.6 3.6 12.0
9 .00 .01 .05 2.5 1.6 3.6 12.0
Á = 1:5
1 .42 .49 .20 4.9 2.1 3.3 31.2
2 .24 .30 .09 2.9 1.7 3.8 17.1
3 .19 .24 .06 2.6 1.6 4.0 13.4
4 .17 .22 .06 2.5 1.6 4.0 12.8
5 .11 .15 .05 2.3 1.6 4.2 12.5
7 .05 .07 .04 2.3 1.7 4.4 13.0
9 .02 .03 .04 2.3 1.7 4.6 13.2
Notes: This table reports simulated moments for di®erent assumptions regarding
the response of monetary policy to the output gap (Á) in the adverse economic
environment, characterized by shocks drawn from the 1968-1983 covariance and an
steady-state real interest rate (r¤) of 1 percent.
Policy follows Taylor-type rule: it = maxf0;r¤
t + ¹ ¼t + 0:5(¹ ¼t ¡ ¼¤) + Áytg.
Central bank loss: L = E
©
(¼ ¡ ¼¤)2 + y2 + 0:25 ¤ (i ¡ i¤)2ª
, where i¤ = ¼¤ + r¤.
rate low for a period after the ZLB no longer binds.
This modi¯ed rule nearly eliminates the e®ects of the ZLB for in°ation targets as low
as 3 percent, and signi¯cantly reduces them for lower in°ation targets. If the in°ation goal
is 2 percent, the modi¯ed rule with a greater response to output of Á = 1 yields the same
outcomes as the unconstrained Taylor rule in this adverse environment.
In rational expectations models like FRB/US, policies with inertial responses to move-
ments in in°ation and output gaps perform much better than static Taylor-type rules and
closely approximate the outcomes under fully optimal policies (Woodford 2003, Levin and
21Table 4: Alternative Monetary Policy Rules in Adverse Environment
(1968-83 shock covariance and r¤ = 1)
In°ation Probability Std. Dev.
Target i < 0:1 i < 1 y < ¡4 y ¼ i L
Classic Taylor rule with lagged adjustment (Á = 0:5)
1 .18 .26 .12 3.7 1.6 2.8 19.4
2 .12 .19 .10 3.2 1.6 2.8 14.7
3 .07 .13 .09 3.0 1.6 2.8 13.6
4 .04 .08 .08 3.0 1.6 3.0 13.7
5 .03 .05 .08 2.9 1.6 2.9 13.0
7 .00 .01 .08 2.9 1.6 2.9 13.0
9 .00 .00 .08 2.9 1.6 2.9 13.0
Taylor-type rule with lagged adjustment (Á = 1)
1 .32 .40 .12 3.6 1.6 3.2 27.6
2 .21 .28 .07 2.9 1.6 3.4 13.6
3 .16 .22 .06 2.5 1.6 3.4 11.7
4 .05 .15 .06 2.5 1.6 3.5 11.7
5 .02 .09 .06 2.5 1.6 3.5 11.8
7 .00 .03 .05 2.5 1.6 3.6 12.0
9 .00 .01 .05 2.5 1.6 3.6 12.0
Optimized inertial policy rule
1 .24 .33 .10 3.4 1.4 2.4 14.5
2 .15 .22 .08 2.9 1.4 2.6 11.9
3 .11 .16 .07 2.7 1.4 2.6 11.0
4 .05 .08 .06 2.5 1.4 2.6 10.2
5 .02 .04 .06 2.5 1.4 2.7 10.1
7 .00 .01 .06 2.5 1.4 2.7 10.2
9 .00 .00 .06 2.5 1.4 2.7 10.2
Notes: This table reports simulated moments for di®erent assumptions regarding
the response of monetary policy to the output gap (Á) in an adverse economic
environment, characterized by shocks drawn from the 1968-1983 covariance and an
steady-state real interest rate (r¤)of 1 percent.
Alternative monetary policies are described in the text.
Inertial policy: iu
t = 0:96iu
t¡1 + 0:04 ¤ (r¤ + ¼t) + 0:04(¹ ¼t ¡ ¼¤) + 0:12yt,
Williams 2003). In particular, I examine the performance of the policy rule taking the form:
iu
t = 0:96iu
t¡1 + 0:04 ¤ (r¤ + ¼t) + 0:04(¼t ¡ ¼¤) + 0:12yt; (4)
where iu
t is the prescription for the federal funds rate unconstrained by the ZLB. The
coe±cient on the lagged interest rate of near unity imparts a great deal of inertia policy
(also frequently referred to as \interest rate smoothing"). The actual setting of the interest
rate must satisfy the ZLB:
it = maxf0;iu
t g: (5)
22As shown in Reifschneider and Williams (2000), policy rules like this perform very well in
the presence of the ZLB because they promise to keep interest rates low in the future and to
allow in°ation to rise above its long-run target following bouts of excessively low in°ation.
This inertial policy rule delivers better macroeconomic performance with a 2 percent
in°ation target than the classic Taylor rule unconstrained by the ZLB. The lower part of
Table 4 reports the simulated outcomes from inertial version of the Taylor-type rule where
the parameters of the rule were chosen to yield minimum weighted variances of in°ation,
the output gap, and the nominal interest rate. Nonetheless, in this worst case adverse
environment, there are limits to what this simple rule can accomplish, and performance
su®ers noticeably as the in°ation goal is lowered to much below 2 percent. I obtain very
similar results for a policy rule that targets the price level growing at a deterministic trend
rather than the in°ation rate, which Eggerston and Woodford (2003) ¯nd to perform well
in the presence of the ZLB. Based on this evidence, there is little gain from switching from
an optimized inertial policy to an explicit price-level targeting regime, even with very low
steady-state in°ation rates.
A potential problem with these alternative policy approaches is that the public may be
confused by monetary policy intentions in the vicinity of the ZLB. For example, the asym-
metric policy rule described represents a signi¯cant deviation from the standard reaction
function, which could have unintended undesirable consequences(Taylor 2007). More gen-
erally, all of these alternative policies rely extensively on the expectations of future policy
actions to in°uence economic outcomes. As shown by Reifschneider and Roberts (2006)
and Williams (2006), if agents do not have rational expectations, episodes of the ZLB may
distort expectations, reducing the bene¯ts of policies that work very well under rational
expectations. In particular, inertial and price-level targeting policies cause in°ation to rise
above the long-run target following an episode where the ZLB constrains policy. Such a
period of high in°ation could conceivably undermine the public's con¯dence in the central
bank's commitment to price stability and lead to an untethering of in°ation expectations.
Indeed, central banks have averse to declaring a desire to see a sustained rise in in°ation
23rise above the target level (Kohn 2009, Walsh 2009).
One method to minimize the public confusion is for the central bank to clearly commu-
nicate the central bank's expectations, including the anticipated policy path, as discussed
by Woodford (2005) and Rudebusch and Williams (2008).14 Another approach is to back
up the communication with interventions in foreign exchange{as proposed by McCallum
(2000), Svensson (2001), and Coenen and Wieland (2003){or by targeting the short to mid-
dle end of the yield curve of Treasury securities as analyzed by McGough, Rudebusch and
Williams (2005).
An additional potential problem with highly inertial and price-level targeting policies is
that historically, the price level and interest rates tend to be relatively high as the economy
enters a recession because of high in°ation rates near the end of expansions.15 In these
circumstances, such policies imply delayed policy responses early in a downturn. The current
episode illustrates this dilemma. As seen in Figure 3, in°ation had been consistently running
above 2 percent in several countries well into 2008. Although model simulations do not bear
out these concerns, perhaps there is something missing from the dynamics in the models or
the assumed monetary policies.
4.2 Counter-cyclical Fiscal Policy
The active use of counter-cyclical ¯scal policy was excluded from consideration in most
quantitative research on the ZLB and the simulations reported above. The experience
of the past decade suggests that this assumption is too stringent. In this respect, by
ignoring the ways in which ¯scal policy is used to substitute for monetary policy, the
future e®ects of the ZLB may be overstated. The past decade has seen the active use
of sizable discretionary countercyclical ¯scal policy in many countries. Japan aggressively
used ¯scal policy to stimulate the economy during the 1990s and the current recession. The
14Although a few central banks publish interest rate paths and the Bank of Canada recently made clear
statements about its intended path, most central banks remain unwilling to provide such clear communication
of their future policy intents.
15This observation is related to the strong correlation between the slope of the yield curve and recessions
(Rudebusch and Williams, 2009). Past recessions are preceded by periods of monetary tightening in response
to periods of high in°ation.
24International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2009) expects discretionary ¯scal policy to average 1
percent of GDP in the G-20 economies over the period of 2008-2010, above and beyond
automatic stabilizers and measures to support the ¯nancial sector.
Economic theory is clear that in the presence of nominal rigidities government spending
can be useful at reducing the macroeconomic costs associated with the ZLB (see, for ex-
ample, Eggertsson 2009; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2009; and Erceg and Lind¶ e
2009). Consider the case where, due a negative shock to the economy, the short-term in-
terest rate declines but cannot fall enough to o®set the shock. As a result, the real interest
rate rises, consumption falls, and in°ation falls. These consequences reduce household wel-
fare. A temporary increase in government purchases increases output and raises wages and
thereby marginal cost. This increase in marginal cost boosts the in°ation rate and the
expected rate of in°ation. Given a ¯xed short-term nominal interest rate constrained by
the ZLB, the rise in expected in°ation lowers the real interest rate, causing consumption to
rise. As a result, the increase in government spending reduces the °uctuations in in°ation
and the output gap and raises welfare.16
In principle, any number of ways of strengthening automatic stabilizers or introduc-
ing stronger counter-cyclical ¯scal policy more generally could help mitigate the problems
caused by the ZLB. Reifschneider and Roberts (2006) provide an example of the e®ects of
¯scal policy stimulus when the ZLB is constraining policy using simulations of the FRB/US
model. I consider one simple experiment based on a systematic ¯scal policy rule for the
category of federal government purchases excluding employee compensation and investment
purchases (a category that makes up about one half of federal government purchases). The
estimated ¯scal reaction function for this category in the FRB/US model is given by:
gt = 0:55gt¡1 + 0:07gt¡2 + 0:19gt¡3 ¡ 0:0004yt + 0:0027yt¡1 + °(it¡1 ¡ iu
t¡1) + ²t; (6)
where g is the log of government purchases in this category, yh is the output gap, and iu
16In contrast to the case of government spending, the e®ects of income taxes with respect to the ZLB
can be counterintuitive. In models without credit and liquidity constraints, lowering income taxes can be
counterproductive because it lowers marginal costs and and in°ation (Eggertsson and Woodford 2004). In
such a model, raising taxes during a downturn can improve welfare. In models with liquidity-constrained
consumers, tax cut can also raise demand.
25is the setting of the unconstrained federal funds rate that would occur absent the ZLB.
In the baseline model, ° = 0. I consider the e®ects of a sustained increase in federal
government purchases when the ZLB constrains monetary policy by setting ° = 0:02. This
value implies that a one percentage point interest rate gap owing to the ZLB causes overall
federal government purchases to rise by 1 percent in the next period. Lags in ¯scal policy
implementation are approximated by the lag structure of this equation.
The modi¯ed ¯scal reaction function cuts in half the macroeconomic e®ects of the ZLB
for low steady-state interest rates of 3 and 4 percent. The lower part of Table 5 shows the
outcomes from this experiment for the Taylor-type rule with Á = 1. The upper part of
the table shows the same rule without the ¯scal response. In the worst case scenario, an
in°ation target of 3 percent is su±cient to avoid e®ects from the ZLB. An in°ation target
of 2 percent su®ers a small increase in output variability. This speci¯cation for the ¯scal
reaction function is in no way meant to be optimal or even desirable, but rather to illustrate
the e®ects of countercyclical ¯scal policy aimed at mitigating the e®ects of the ZLB on the
economy. Further research is needed in this area to devised better countercyclical ¯scal
policy rules.
4.3 Unconventional monetary policy actions
The preceding discussion and analysis abstracted from unconventional monetary actions,
implicitly assumes that these are not used or are ine®ective. However, the events of the
past year provide ample evidence that central banks possess and are willing to use tools
other than the overnight interest rate. Clouse et al (2003) and Bernanke and Reinhart
(2004) describe alternative policy tools available to the Federal Reserve. In the current
crisis, a number of alternative approaches have been put to use. Several central banks,
including the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve, and the
Bank of Japan, have instituted programs to buy or guarantee assets such as commercial
paper and mortgage-backed securities. Finally, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England
,and the Federal Reserve have expanded their holdings of longer-term securities through
the creation of reserves. Many of these programs are aimed at improving the functioning
26Table 5: Alternative Fiscal Policy in Adverse Environment
(1968-83 shock covariance and r¤ = 1)
In°ation Probability Std. Dev.
Target i < 0:1 i < 1 y < ¡4 y ¼ i L
Baseline ¯scal policy
2 .34 .41 .17 4.6 2.1 2.6 27.3
3 .16 .22 .08 3.1 1.7 3.3 15.2
4 .11 .15 .06 2.7 1.6 3.4 13.1
5 .08 .12 .06 2.6 1.6 3.4 12.4
6 .06 .10 .06 2.5 1.6 3.5 12.0
8 .02 .03 .05 2.5 1.6 3.6 12.0
10 .00 .01 .05 2.5 1.6 3.6 12.0
Government spending increase at zero bound
2 .31 .39 .12 3.9 2.0 2.8 21.2
3 .16 .23 .07 2.8 1.6 3.2 13.3
4 .12 .17 .06 2.6 1.6 3.3 12.2
5 .08 .12 .06 2.5 1.6 3.4 11.8
6 .06 .10 .06 2.5 1.6 3.5 11.9
8 .02 .03 .05 2.5 1.6 3.6 12.0
10 .00 .01 .05 2.5 1.6 3.6 12.0
Notes: This table reports simulated moments for di®erent assumptions regarding
the response of ¯scal policy in the presence of the ZLB, in an adverse macroeconomic
environment, characterized by shocks drawn from the 1968-1983 covariance and an
steady-state real interest rate (r¤)of 1 percent.
Monetary policy rule: it = maxf0;r¤
t + ¹ ¼t + 0:5(¼t ¡ ¼¤) + ytg.
Central bank loss: L = E
©
(¼ ¡ ¼¤)2 + y2 + 0:25 ¤ (i ¡¹ i)2ª
, where i¤ = ¼¤ + r¤.
of impaired or distressed markets. Similarly, the Federal Reserve's purchases of agency
debt and mortgage-backed securities were aimed at market segment that appeared to be
functioning poorly. Future recessions may not be accompanied by severe ¯nancial market
disruptions, in which case these tools would not be as useful at o®setting the shocks hitting
the economy.
An open question is whether balance sheet policies such as quantitative easing or
purchases of longer-term government securities are e®ective at stimulating the economy.
Bernanke et al (2004) provide evidence that shocks to the supply of government securi-
ties a®ect their price and yield. Announcements by the Bank of England and the Federal
Reserve regarding plans to buy longer-term government securities were followed by large
movements in yields, providing additional support that such policy actions can a®ect yields
(see Meier 2009, for a summary of the experience in the UK). Nonetheless, there is a great
27deal of uncertainty regarding the magnitude and duration of these e®ects. In addition,
some observers fear adverse consequences of such actions if taken on a large scale, including
the risk of large losses and the concerns that in°ation expectations may become unmoored.
Further careful study and analysis is needed before these policy options can be counted on
as e®ective substitutes for more traditional monetary policy actions.
5 Conclusion
The zero lower bound has signi¯cantly constrained the ability of many central banks to stim-
ulate the economy in the current recession. Counterfactual simulations suggest that the ZLB
will impose signi¯cant costs on the U.S. economy in terms of lost output. Although these
simulation focus on the e®ects of lower U.S. interest rates on the U.S. economy, comparable
simulations for other economies where the ZLB has constrained monetary policy{such as
in Japan and Europe{would no doubt show that the ZLB has also entailed signi¯cant costs
in those places during the recent episode. A useful extension of the simulations reported in
this paper would be to calculate the costs of the ZLB in a model of the global economy.
If the recent recession represents an unique, extraordinary incident, it has no particular
implications for future monetary policy with respect to the ZLB. In particular, a 2 percent
in°ation target should provide an adequate bu®er for monetary policy in the future. If,
however, the era of the Great Moderation is over and the steady-state real interest rate
remains very low, then the ZLB may regularly interfere with the ability of central banks
to achieve macroeconomic stabilization goals. The analysis in this paper argues that an
in°ation target of 2 percent may be insu±cient to keep the ZLB from imposing sizable costs
in terms of macroeconomic stabilization in a much more adverse macroeconomic climate if
monetary policy follows the standard Taylor Rule.
Given these results, it is important to study and develop monetary and ¯scal policies
that e®ectively counter the e®ects of the ZLB in preparation for the contingency of an
adverse macroeconomic environment. Arguably, the application of aspects of many of these
approaches over the past two years has helped combat the massive shocks that have bu®eted
28the global economy. Improving these policies and developing new ones into systematic,
predictable responses to economic conditions will help make them more e®ective in the
future. An important lesson from the ¯nancial crisis, not addressed in this paper, is the
critical need for e®ective regulation and supervision of ¯nancial markets to avoid the shocks
to the global economy that ignited the current global ¯nancial crisis and recession.
Finally, this paper examines only the costs associated with the ZLB, abstracting from
the many other sources of distortions related to steady-state in°ation. Several of these{
including transaction costs, real distortions associated with non-zero rates of in°ation, and
non-neutralities in the tax system{argue for zero or negative steady-state in°ation rates.
Others{including asymmetries in wage setting, imperfections in labor markets, distortions
related to imperfect competition, and measurement bias{argue for positive steady-state
in°ation (see, for example, Akerlof et al 1996). Unfortunately, there has been relatively
little research that weighs the costs of the ZLB against these other in°uences in a coherent,
empirically-supported framework (see Billi and Kahn, 2008, for a review).17 More research
on these issues is needed.
17Much of the literature focuses on welfare costs related to holding zero interest bearing assets, which
both Feldstein (1997) and Attansio et al (2002) convincing show are trivial. These costs are even lower now
that the Federal Reserve and many other central banks pay interest on reserves.
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